Naija dey carry last: Can Nigeria function depsite corruption?
As we pass through a checkpoint, I push a few notes of crumped Naira into the expectant palm of an armed guard.
“Thank you Ma.”
I don’t so much acknowledge him as the driver pulls away and the window winds up.
I’ve just engaged in one of Nigeria's most common informal transactions, the ‘dash.’ Corruption is stitched so tightly into our culture that I, more often than not, forget that this is a bribe. It’s widely believed that Nigeria is held together because of corruption. This belief implies that Nigeria is functioning despite being riddled with corruption from the village to the state level. However, corruption does not hold the African state together; instead, it is the very element that renders Nigeria unable to function at the capacity it could. Nigeria has the capacity, both functionally and materially, to meet the needs of its citizens. Still, due to the perverseness of “corruption culture” which has only been exacerbated in the post-colonial period, it falls more than short. The global dominance of the capitalist ideology forced emerging states to comply with the status quo and “keep up” with the states around them. But of course, that is unrealistic when states have had centuries to develop stable democracies, whereas African states had mere decades. Corruption became so pervasive in Africa because of colonialism, precisely because of the extractive nature of colonialism. This corruption means that these states are not held together at all but are instead (in my opinion) failing. In international relations, failed states are usually “one that has lost both its effectiveness and legitimacy (GOLDSTONE, 2008).” Effectiveness meaning the capability to carry out state functions that include but are not limited to providing security or levying taxes. Legitimacy meaning the support of important groups of the population I do hate a realist perspective, and when we view this definition through a realist lens as intended, these “important groups” realistically just mean the bourgeois class. I believe a state is failed when a state cannot carry out its functions effectively and when the needs of its wider population are not met, its legitimacy should not be contingent on a small group of elites.
Colonialism created the conditions for corruption to be as widespread in Africa as today. It was (perhaps still is) an invasive and persistent vine whose tendrils took root in the fertile soil of Africa. It strangled the vitality of the land it invades, plunders its resources, disrupts its indigenous systems, and sows corruption. The legacy of colonial exploitation continues to taint the continent, eroding the foundations of governance and fostering a culture where corruption thrives as a weed in a neglected garden of sovereignty. During colonisation, a new bourgeois class emerged in Africa whose members acquired Western education through the colonizers and their missionaries and, therefore, were most exposed to European colonial ideologies of all African groups (Ekeh, 1975). Extracting labour and resources from the bottom to the top is a core colonial ideology. Because of the closeness of the African Bourgeois to colonialist teaching, this isn’t an ideology that necessarily disappeared post-colonialism. The Bourgeois class accepted the principles implicit in colonialism. Still, it rejected the foreign personnel that ruled Africa (Ekeh, 1975), meaning that after independence, existing structures were kept when existing structures were the very issue. Colonial states are extractive and coercive, and simply making them “anti-racist”, believing it would alleviate the material conditions of those in a state, is neo-liberal thinking. It does not matter the race of the oppressor if they are still an oppressor, capitalism is the problem not who is performing it. Coercive conditions will only lead to corruption.
The Bourgeois class were also too adamant to show that their standards of education and administration were as good as those of their former colonisers. African bourgeoisie in every post-colonial nation had striven to show that their educational and administrative standards were as high as their former colonisers. Such demonstrations aim to prove they are equal to, but never better than, their former rulers (and here is in which lies the problem). When Africans fought for independence, many leaders boasted to their followers that they had the same qualifications as colonizers, that they could have as democratic a rule as those in England and France, that African bureaucracy could be as efficient as that in Britain or France, etc (Ekeh, 1975). In this pursuit, overzealousness can lead to a rush to meet these standards, ignoring the fact that democracy took thousands of years of thinkers and social change even before colonialism. To keep up with the demands of a better society, the expectation of being equal to colonizers and even better will result in corruption. Aside from that, the African bourgeois class, in and out of politics, encouraged the common man to shirk his duties to the government or to see them as burdens while demanding his rights. The African bourgeois class needed to sabotage alien personnel to replace them. Inadvertently, this approach undermined their legitimacy by abrogating their duties and obligations to the colonial government and extending rights beyond the number of resources available. The promise of independence often failed to materialise significant changes in ordinary citizens' material or physical conditions, illustrating the transfer effect from colonialism to postcolonial politics and the continued struggle for true emancipation.
There was no overhaul of these coercive systems so that they could foster and create the moral economy of corruption in Africa today. According to Mbembe, Africa's moral economy of corruption is deeply rooted in its postcolonial context (Mbembe, 1992), and is characterised by a syncretic blend of cultural norms and historical legacies left by colonialism. For the twentieth century, the building of state apparatus has remained incomplete, contributing to both the proliferation of corrupt practices and their cultural acceptance (Olivier de Sardan, 1998). Despite the legal condemnation of corruption in Nigeria, there is a stark dissonance between legal frameworks and the prevalence, normalisation, and cultural acceptance of corrupt practices. While on the governmental level, we have clerks claiming a snake ate 36 million naira of state funds, on the street level, we have shopkeepers selling fake boxes of Indomie. The disjunction between legal norms and social realities is at the heart of corruption's sociological challenge, underscoring the interplay between institutional structures, cultural norms, and individual behaviour. Corruption is a cumulative and expansive process which is hardly reversible, and the more it develops, the more it becomes engrained in social habits, creating a “corruption culture (Sardan, 1999).” While corruption on a social level is a problem, it is primarily corruption on the state level that is the issue. Corruption is a result of the incompetence of the state apparatus.
As noted previously, states are not considered failed if they are legitimised by “important groups” (GOLDSTONE, 2008)). But when these “important groups” facilitate corruption themselves, I would question if they are aiding the state to function at all. When we characterize a non-failing state as one that is legitimised by "important groups," we essentially allow the opinions of a few to rule the majority, which results in a concentration of power and influence in the hands of a privileged elite. As a result, inequality and marginalization are perpetuated, where the needs and aspirations of the broader population are ignored. The result is resentment, social unrest, and a growing sense of alienation among disenfranchised communities, undermining the state's social cohesion and stability. The contrast between this generalised discourse on the illegality of corruption and the almost overwhelming impunity enjoyed by those given over to these practices is particularly striking. There is rarely any evidence of trials of the guilty in Nigeria or consistent and effective legal or political campaigns against the corruption complex. The flagrant lack of prosecution is evident at all levels and applies as much to ‘big-time corruption’ as to ‘petty corruption’ (Sardan, 1999). This systemic failure to hold perpetrators accountable further undermines the legitimacy of institutions. It erodes public trust, perpetuating a cycle of corruption that subverts efforts towards sustainable development and effective governance.
Other elements rather than corruption are responsible for somewhat “holding together” African states. Diversity isn’t often offered as an element holding African states together. In his seminal work "The Clash of Civilizations," Huntington argues that Africa's and other regions' diversity create potential fault lines for conflict due to competing cultural and religious identities (Huntington, 1996). African countries are often characterised by significant ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. While this diversity can sometimes lead to tensions and conflicts, it fosters resilience and adaptability within these societies. Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted a major public opinion survey in more than 60 languages in 19 countries involving more than 25,000 interviews. In the survey, Africans ranked unemployment, crime, and corruption as bigger problems than religious conflict (but Nigerians and Rwandans said religious conflict was a big problem). Religious conflicts vary in severity from country to country, but they are often accompanied by ethnic conflicts, suggesting that they are often linked (Center, 2010). Rather than focusing on corruption as the primary glue holding these diverse populations together, it is essential to consider other factors contributing to social cohesion, such as shared cultural practices, historical experiences, and national identities. African societies have demonstrated remarkable resilience in navigating complex social landscapes despite ethnic and linguistic diversity. Communities often come together in times of crisis, drawing strength from their diversity and collective identities to overcome adversity. Furthermore, the rich tapestry of cultural traditions and customs makes diverse populations feel like they belong and share the same heritage. Hence, while corruption presents significant challenges to African governance and development, the inherent diversity of African societies ultimately holds states together.
You cannot build a state on corruption. A 2024 study finds that countries with higher levels of legislative, judicial, and executive corruption are associated with higher levels of hunger (Henri Njangang, 2024). Across Africa, corruption's pervasive presence undermines the foundations of governance and development. Corruption erodes trust in institutions, distorts economic systems, and perpetuates inequality. When bribery, embezzlement, and nepotism become entrenched in the fabric of society, the state loses its legitimacy and ability to serve its citizens effectively. Instead of fostering progress and prosperity, corruption stifles innovation, hampers investment, and perpetuates a cycle of poverty. It distorts resource allocation, diverting funds away from essential services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure and enriching a select few at the expense of the many. Nigerians now face the worst cost of living crisis and civil unrest in decades. The price of a 110kg bag of rice has risen by 70% since the middle of last year. People cannot afford fuel. Children are starving. Their government is clamping down on their constitutional right to peaceful protest. Without transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, a state built on corruption is doomed to crumble under the weight of its venality, unable to fulfil its fundamental responsibilities to its people, creating, in my opinion, a failed state. Such is the fate of Nigeria.
Bibliography
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